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BANKRUPTCY REFORM AND THE

CONSTITUTION: RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 522f)(2)
"TAKES" PRIVATE PROPERTY
By
JAMES B. CRAVEN III*

and
PAMELA A. BATES-SMITH**

Bankruptcy is premised in part on the desire to allow individuals to retain enough assets to begin life over. As part of
this premise, Congress enacted section 52(ffl(2) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. This provision allows debtors to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchasemoney security interests in otherwise
exempt property. This provision has created problems,
however, as debtors have argued that it acts retroactively to
void security interestscreatedbefore the Act's enactment date.
In Rodrock v. Security IndustrialBank, the Supreme Court will
decide whether Congress intended such retroactive application
to occur, and if it did, whether such action constitutes a
"taking" under the fifth amendment This article will argue
that principles of statutory construction, as applied historically
in bankruptcy cases, should result in a finding that Congress
did not intend for retroactive application.Alternatively, the article will argue that application to security interests created
prior to Nov. 6, 1978, violates the fifth amendment's prohibition
of taking private property without just compensationt
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, the United States Congress overhauled the federal
bankruptcy laws. As part of that recodification, Congress
enacted section 522(f)(2) 1 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
* A.B., Univ. of North Carolina, 1964; J.D., Duke Univ., 1967; M. Div., Duke
Univ., 1981.
** B.S., Birmingham-Southern College, 1975; M.A. Ed., Univ. of Alabama,
1976; J.D., Cumberland School of Law, Samford Univ., 1981.

f Ed.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1979). This section provides that:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may
avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the
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(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The provision allows debtors
to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests2
in otherwise exempt property. Along with section 522(f)(1),1 the
legislation reflects Congress' desire to allow debtors to retain
some property in order to make a new start in life.'
Application of section 522(f)(2) has created problems, however, when the creditor obtained the nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest prior to November 6, 1978, the enactment date of the Act.' The United States Supreme Court likely
will decide the issue of retroactive application of section 522(f)(2)
in the near future. Seven cases, consolidated in the lower court
extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would
have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(a) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or
jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or
household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
2 A nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest is created when a
creditor provides a loan which is secured by property not obtained by use of the
loan itself and not pledged to the creditor. Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-107, 9-305
(Anderson 1971).
3 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) permits avoidance of judicial liens.
I H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 362, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4963, 6318.
For purposes of § 522(f) analysis, security interests and judicial liens may
be placed in three categories. Those which came into being prior to Nov. 6, 1978,
the Act's enactment date, may be referred to as "pre-enactment" interests. The
term "gap liens" may be applied to interests created between Nov. 6, 1978, and
Oct. 1, 1979, the Act's effective date. "Post-enactment" liens are those created
after Oct. 1, 1979. This article deals only with the constitutionality of applying §
522(f)(2) to "pre-enactment" interests.
A recent decision has collected cases dealing with application of § 522(f)(2) at
each stage of this time continuum. In re Morris, 12 Bankr. 321, 325 n.6 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill 1981). In this well-researched opinion, the court detailed the evolution of
bankruptcy law from medieval England to the present and examined the cases
decided by the Supreme Court during the 1930s concerning the taking and due
process questions presented by statutes which impaired property interests. The
court concluded that application of § 522(f)(2) to interests created prior to the
Act's enactment, between the enactment and effective dates, or after the effective date did not violate the Constitution, either as a taking of private property
for public use without just compensation or as a violation of due process.
See also, Comment, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1616 (1981).
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decision of Rodrock v. Security IndustrialBank,' are before the
Court. Each challenges retroactive application of the statute on
two premises. First, the finance companies and banks which
brought the cases argue that Congress did not intend for
522(f)(2) to apply retroactively. Second, they claim that if Congress did intend for such application, such action constitutes a
"taking" in violation of the fifth amendment.
In all seven cases consolidated in Rodrock, the debtors borrowed money prior to November 6, 1978, the date Congress approved the legislation, from local banks or finance companies.
The lenders secured these loans with personal property of the
debtors. The security interests were non-possessory and nonpurchase money in nature. In the case of the Rodrock family, the
collateral consisted of fifteen items of household furniture, including a color television set and a sewing machine with table
valued at $580. In another case, furniture, kitchenware, a sewing
machine and a movie projector valued at $540 were used to
secure a loan. In both of these cases, the collateral for the loans
represented every household item owned. The fact situations in
the other five cases were similar to these.
After October 1, 1979, all seven families found themselves
unable to pay their bills, and all filed bankruptcy petitions. They
also claimed that the property used as collateral for their loans
was exempt under section 522(f)(2); therefore, the creditors' liens
on that property should be voided. In each case, the creditors
moved to dismiss the debtor's complaint for lien avoidance on
two grounds. First, the creditors argued that Congress had not
intended section 522(f)(2) to be applied retroactively. Second,
they claimed that retroactive application, if intended by Congress, was unconstitutional as a taking. The lower courts
dismissed the debtors' complaints, although for differing
reasons.
A bankruptcy judge in Kansas held that the Congress had
not intended for section 522(f)(2) to apply to a security interest
6 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.), prob. juris. noted sub nomi., United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, No. 81-184, 50 U.S.L.W. 3486 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1981). See also,
In re Gifford, 50 U.S.L.W. 2454 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 1982) (Section 522(fD(2) does not
apply to "pre-enactment" liens).
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which came into being before the legislation's enactment date.7
Bankruptcy judges in Colorado ruled that Congress had intended
retroactive applications, but that such action violated the fifth
amendment.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit found that Congress had intended section 522(f)(2) to apply to security interests which vested prior to October 1, 1979,
the effective date of the Reform Act.9
If the Reform Act were applied only to those cases commenced after October 1, 1979, which involved security interests
which came into existence after that date, there would be no
bankruptcy law applicable to cases filed after October 1, 1979,
but involving security interests which were fixed prior to October 1, 1979.10
Relying heavily on the 1938 Supreme Court decision of
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,1 the court said
that section 522(f)(2) could not constitutionally be applied to a
creditor's security interest which came into being prior to the
enactment date of the Reform Act. "In the instant cases, the
creditors acquired rights in specific property prior to the enactment of the Reform Act, and, under Radford, these vested
rights cannot be taken from the creditor for the benefit of the
debtor." 2
As noted, the Rodrock cases pose both issues of statutory
construction and of constitutional application. If the Supreme
Court declines to apply section 522(f)(2) retroactively, then the
creditors' constitutional challenge becomes moot. If the Court
does find that Congress intended that the provision be applied
retroactively, then the Court must reach the issue of the legislation's constitutionality.
This article will deal with each issue in turn, arguing first
that traditional principles of statutory construction, especially
" Schulte v. Beneficial Fin. of Kansas, Inc., 8 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. D. Kansas
1980) (consolidated cases).
S Jackson v. Security Indus. Bank, 4 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (con-

solidated cases); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. and Sec. Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 635
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (consolidated cases).
' Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193. 1196 (10th Cir. 1981) (consolidated cases).

Id.at 1196-97.
295 U.S. 555 (1935).

642 F.2d at 1197.
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as they have been applied to bankruptcy statutes, require prospective application only. Should the Court find that Congress
intended retroactive application, then the provision should be
declared unconstitutional because such action destroys property
rights created prior to enactment of the statute.
II.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

The Supreme Court may avoid the constitutional question in
Rodrock by construing section 522(f)(2) as having prospective
application only. Both the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 and case law involving statutory construction of prior bankruptcy statutes support prospective application of section 522(f)(2).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act contains no express provision
stating or necessarily implying that section 522(f)(2) voids
security interests created prior to the enactment date of the
Code. The law merely provides that "(e)xcept as otherwise provided in this title, this Act shall take effect on October 1, 1979." 1
Thus, in determining the question of retroactive application, a
court must consider the legislative history of the Act.
The legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended for section 522(f)(2) to apply retroactively. Rather, the
legislative history reveals an awareness of the problems created
by retroactive application and an intent to preserve the constitutionally protected interests of secured creditors. For example, with respect to a similar provision of the Act concerning exemptions, section 522(c),14 the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Reports state that: "(t)he bankruptcy discharge will not
prevent enforcement of valid liens. The rule of Long v. Bullard,
[citations omitted], is accepted with respect to the enforcement
of valid liens on nonexempt property as well as on exempt property. Cf. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford [citation
omitted]."'5 This express "acceptance" of the enforceability of
" 11 U.S.C. § 402(a). With certain administrative exceptions, cases commenced before Oct. 1, 1979, continue to be governed substantively and procedurally by
the prior Bankruptcy Act. Id. at § 403(a-e).
Id. at § 522(c).
" H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.; S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 6316, 5863 (emphasis
added).
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valid liens and the citation to Radford show Congress' concern
for pre-existing rights.
In addition to this evidence of congressional intent, the
Supreme Court should apply "the first rule of construction"-a
statute should be presumed to apply prospectively only unless a
contrary intent is "the unequivocal and inflexible import of its
terms and the manifest intention of the legislature.""6 Here, no
"unequivocal and inflexible" expression of such intent exists.
Rather, to the extent the legislative history reflects Congress'
understanding regarding retroactive application, the evidence
points in the opposite direction.
Judicial construction of amendments to the prior bankruptcy
statute reinforces these general principles of construction and
points toward prospective application. In various cases concerning amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, courts avoided
impairment of vested property rights by applying the statutes
prospectively. In each instance, courts declined to apply the
amendments retroactively.
For example, in 1910, Congress gave a bankruptcy trustee
essentially the same rights possessed by a lien creditor. In a
challenge to the statute, the Court refused to apply the provision retroactively, thus avoiding the constitutional problem.17
We are of the opinion that the act should not be construed to
impair it. We do not need to consider whether or how far in any
event the constitutional power of Congress would have been
limited. It is enough that the reasonable and usual interpretation of such statutes is to confine their effect, so far as may be,
to property rights established after they were passed ...The

opposite construction would not simply extend a remedy, but
would impute to the act of Congress an intent to take away
rights lawfully retained, and unimpeachable at the moment
when they took their start.18
"SGreene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964). See also, Union Pacific R. Co.
v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190 (1913); Edgar v. Fred Jones LincolnMercury, 524 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1975); Martin v. Bankers Trust Co.,.417 F. Supp.
923 (W.D. Va. 1976), affd, 565 F.2d 1276 (4th Cir. 1977).
Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
"Id at 639-40.
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During the Great Depression, Congress passed the Chandler
Act 9 as part of the country's economic recovery program. The
legislation provided that a landlord's lien on a renter's personal
property would have priority in bankruptcy proceedings only
with respect to rent due "within three months before the date of
bankruptcy."2 The question then arose as to the effect of the
Act on a lien created more than three months prior to the
legislation's effective date. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that the landlord's statutory lien for
rent was a property right which had vested prior to the effective date of the Chandler Act.2' Therefore, retroactive application of the Act would destroy the lien on rent owed beyond the
three-month cutoff period. To avoid declaring the act unconstitutional, the court stated that:
There is nothing contained in the Chandler Act to indicate that
Congress intended that [it] should be construed retroactively;
and in the absence of explicit language requiringsuch construction we are not disposed to so construe it, especially when to do
so would result in depriving a citizen of a vested right. It is the
general rule that a retrospective operation will not be given to
a statute which interferes with antecedent rights, unless such
be the unequivocal and inflexible import of its terms and the
manifest intention of the legislature.'
Consequently, the Eight Circuit applied the Act prospectively. Similar constructions have been given to statutes approved by Congress in 1952 and 1966.1 Use of this construction has
avoided the necessity of declaring the statutes unconstitutional
as a violation of the fifth amendment. This construction should
be applied in Rodrock for the same reason.

III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SECTION 522(f)(2)
As noted above, the Supreme Court will reach the fifth
amendment claim only if it decides that Congress intended section
Act of June 22, 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840.
11 U.S.C. § 104(a), amending Act of 1898.
21 107 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939).
1 Id- at 726 (emphasis added). See also, Miles Corp. v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 729
(8th Cir. 1939); In re Michael's Cafeteria, 52 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. La. 1943).
2 See generally,In re Freeze-In Mfg. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich. 1955);
Thomas v. Gulfway Shopping Center, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
II
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522(f)(2) to apply to security interests created prior to November
6, 1978, the enactment date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. In that event, the Court's ruling in Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford24 should control, and retroactive application to security interests created prior to the Act's enactment
date should be declared unconstitutional.
A.

Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford

In 1934, Congress departed from a series of previous
bankruptcy amendments which had been applied prospectively
only and enacted the Frazier-Lemke Act.5 The Act was to apply
retroactively and would impair vested security interests. In
Radford, however, the Court ruled that such retroactive application constituted a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation by impairing vested security interests .2
Radford got its start in 1922 in Christian County, Kentucky,
when William W. Radford, Sr. and his wife mortgaged their
170-acre farm to the Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank. The
farm, then appraised at approximately $18,000, was mortgaged
to secure loans totalling $9,000, with the debt to be repaid in installments over 34 years at six percent interest. As the years
passed, the Radfords began to feel the economic pressures of the
Great Depression. In 1931, they were unable to pay their property
taxes. In 1932 and 1933, they failed to pay taxes or the installments on the principal and interest due on the loan. In 1933,
the Radfords defaulted by failing to keep their covenant with
the Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank to secure insurance on the
buildings located on the farm. At this point, the bank stepped in
and encouraged the Radfords to refinance their indebtedness
under the recently enacted Emergency Farm Mortgage Act.'
When they refused to refinance, the bank declared the entire in24

295 U.S. 555 (1935).

Act of June 29, 1934, Pub. L. No.
2'295 U.S. 555. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part:
"No person ... shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' Act of May 12, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-101, 48 Stat. 31, 41.
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debtedness immediately due and payable, and began foreclosure
proceedings in June, 1933. The suit was stayed when Radford
took steps to avail himself of section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act.'
He filed a petition in the District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky for a compositions of his debt. The petition was approved and a meeting of the creditors was held, but Radford failed
to obtain acceptance of the required number of creditors as well
as the amount of composition proposed. The bank then offered
to accept a deed of the mortgaged property in full satisfaction of
the indebtedness, and to assume the obligation-to pay the unpaid taxes. When Radford refused to execute the deed, a Kentucky state court entered judgment ordering a foreclosure sale
on June 30, 1934.
However, two days prior to the state court judgment, Congress had enacted the Frazier-Lemke Act." That Act provided
that a farmer who failed to obtain the consent of the number of
creditors requisite to a composition under section 75 could take
alternative courses of action with respect to mortgaged property.
On August 6, 1934, and again on November 10, 1934, Radford
filed amended petitions praying that he be adjudged a bankrupt,
that his property, whether free or encumbered, be appraised,
and that he have the relief provided for in the Frazier-Lemke
31
Act.
Under Frazier-Lemke, the bankrupt could, with the mortgagee's assent, purchase the property at its then appraised
value and take title and immediate possession of the property.
In exchange, the bankrupt had to agree to make deferred payments of the purchase price within specified time periods.32
Additionally, if the mortgagee refused to agree to the purchase arrangement the bankrupt could require the bankruptcy
court to stay proceedings for a period of five years. The
11 U.S.C. § 203.

Composition is an agreement between a debtor and creditors in lieu of
distribution of the debtor's property in bankruptcy.
I Act of June 28, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289.
31 1&

1 The debtor had to pay 2.5 percent of the principal within two years, 2.5
percent within three years, 5 percent within four years, 5 percent within five
years and the balance within six years. Id at 1290.
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bankrupt would then retain possession of the property, under
the control of the court, if he paid a reasonable rent to be dis3
tributed among the secured and unsecured creditors. At any
time within five years of the stay, the debtor could pay the court
the appriased value of the property. The court then would turn
over full possession and title of the property to the debtor, who
could then apply for discharge of the indebtedness. This provision was to apply only to debts existing at the time the Act
became effective.
In response to Radford's amended petition, the district court
adjudged him a bankrupt within the meaning of the FrazierLemke Act, and appointed a Referee to commence proceedings
under the Act. The Referee ordered an appraisal of Radford's
property. The fair and reasonable value was found to be $4,445
in December, 1934.1
The Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank refused to consent to
the sale of the property to Radford for that price so the Referee
ordered all proceedings on the mortgage stayed for a period of
five years. The bank then brought an action asserting that the
Frazier-Lemke Act, as applied, had taken from the bank without
compensation, and given to Radford, rights in specific property
of substantial value. The bank claimed that the Act was unconstitutional as a taking under the fifth amendment. Radford
prevailed in the district court," and in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,36 but the Supreme Court
reversed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous Court,
stated:
The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers
of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment. Under the
bankruptcy power Congress may discharge the debtor's (preexisting) personal obligation, because, unlike the States, it is
not prohibited from impairing the obligation of contracts. [citation omitted]. But the effect of the Act here complained of is not
the discharge of Radford's personal obligation. It is the taking
of substantive rights in specific property acquired by the Bank
prior to the Act.3
Id. at 1289.
295 U.S. at 577.
In re Radford, 8 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Ky. 1934).
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 74 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1935).
295 U.S. at 589-90.
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Mr. Justice Brandeis noted that prior bankruptcy laws had
affected creditors' remedies or created certain exemptions for
unemcumbered property. However, the Frazier-Lemke Act was
unique in compelling the holder of a mortgage to surrender to
the debtor both title and possession of the secured property,
even though the debt remained upaid.3 8 Thus, the Act reduced
the creditor's property interest to the mere right to retain its
lien until the bankrupt, sometime within the five-year period,
chose to satisfy the debt by paying the appraised value of the
farm. This, the Court held, worked a substantial impairment of
the bank's vested property rights in violation of the fifth amendment.
The province of the Court is limited to deciding whether the
Frazier-Lemke Act as applied has taken from the Bank without
compensation, and given to Radford, rights in specific property
which are of substantial value ... As. we conclude that the Act
as applied has done so, we must hold it void. For the Fifth
Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's need,
private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly
public use without just compensation. If the public interest rerequires, and permits, the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain;
so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in
the public interest may be borne by the public."
A discussion of Radford would be incomplete without mention of Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh," decided shortly before Radford. In Worthen, the
Supreme Court overturned Arkansas' legislation which retroactively diminished certain remedies available to holders of
bonds issued by one of the state's municipal improvement districts. Noting that the legislation suspended the obligation to
" The fact that Congress had enacted the Frazier-Lemke Act to remedy
what it saw as a serious substantive evil did not justify violating the fifth amendment. Id at 601. Substantive property rights may not be invaded simply because

the legislature would prefer to "promote the public's good rather than the private
welfare of its (secured) creditors." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 29 (1977). Consequently, the simple fact that section 522(f)(2) was designed
to provide debtors with additonal relief in bankruptcy does not eliminate the constitutional guarantees of the fifth amendment.

295 U.S. at 601-02.
295 U.S. 56 (1935).
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pay principal and interest, and deprived the bondholders of
their right to take possession of the mortgaged property during
the term allowed for redemption, the Supreme Court found an
unconstitutional taking.
With studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or
to his appropriate protection they have taken from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational investor... So viewed they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral security. 1
The applicability of Radford and Worthen to Rodrock is inescapable. The bankruptcy power of Congress" is subject to the
fifth amendment, and bankruptcy legislation which substantially
impairs pre-existing security interests is unconstitutional as a
taking." Retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) would effect
an even more substantial impairment than those declared unconstitutional in Radford and Worthen. In Radford, Congress
sought to prohibit the bank from foreclosing its mortgage for
five years while the debtor retained title and possession. In
Worthen, the Arkansas legislature sought to suspend temporarily
the bondholders' right to interest, principal and possession. In
contrast, retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) would completely and permanently destroy the creditor's security interest
in specified property, a result so severe it was not even attempted
by the legislation held unconstitutional in Radford and Worthen.
B.

Radford Progeny

Courts and commentators have recognized the Radford decision as a seminal exposition of fundamental fifth amendment
1 Id. at 60. See also the lower court's holding in W. B. Worthen Co. v. Delinquent Lands, 189 Ark. 723, 75 S.W.2d 62 (1934).
£2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ch. 4.
An important distinction exists between an unconstitutional "taking" by
destroying or substantially impairing a security interest in a debtor's property,
and discharging an unsecured personal debt in bankruptcy, thereby impairing the
obligation of a contract. Bankruptcy legislation may constitutionally discharge a
debtor from his pre-existing personal obligations, Morse v. Hovey, 1 Barb. Ch.
(N.Y.) 404 (1846), but a vested security interest in the debtor's property may not
be destroyed or substantially impaired. Radford, 295 U.S. at 588-90. That the Congress may constitutionally impair contractual expectations does not alter the absolute prohibition exemplified by Radford and its progeny against taking or
substantially impairing secured rights in property. See, e.g., the Gold Clause
Cases, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1934); Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio
R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1934); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 457 (1870).
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principles."' The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
vitality of the fifth amendment command that government may
not take or substantially impair vested security interests held
by creditors.45
After the invalidation of the original Frazier-Lemke Act in
Radford, Congress amended the Act. 6 In Wright v. Mountain
Trust Bank,47 the Supreme Court reviewed the application of
the amended Act to pre-existing security interests. Contrasting
the amended Act with its predecessor, the Court noted that
Congress had been careful in the latter legislation to ensure
that a secured creditor's lien would not be destroyed or subsfantially impaired. 8 Thus, the amended Frazier-Lemke Act provided that existing liens were to remain in full force and effect, and
that the properties covered by such liens were subject "to the
payment of the claims of the secured creditors, as their interests
may appear."49 Moreover, the amended Frazier-Lemke Act's
three-year stay on mortgage foreclosures was inapplicable if the
debtor was incapable of refinancing the property to satisfy the
lien. 0 Because the amended Frazier-Lemke Act preserved the
secured creditor's rights to retain his lien and to move against
the collateral by judicial sale, it did not violate the fifth amendment principles set out in Radford.
The legislation approved in Wright operated on pre-existing
liens in a wholly different fashion than would retroactive application of section 522(f)(2). The amended Fraizer-Lemke Act preserved pre-existing security interests; retroactive application of
section 522(f)(2) would permanently divest the creditor of that
property interest. Thus, the amended Frazier-Lemke Act is an
object lesson in how Congress cna provide debtor relief without
destroying or substantially impairing the value of creditors'
liens."' Retroactive application of section 522(f)(2) does not
achieve this balance.
" See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); In re Blazon
Flexible Flyer, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 861 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Murphy, Restraint and
Reimbursement: the Secured Creditorin Reorganizationand Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. LAW. 15, 23-26 (1974).
" See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
48 Act of Aug. 29, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942.
" 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
" Id. at 457.
'9
'o
51

Id. at 458.
Id. at 461.

See also, Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
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Following Radford and Wright, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Ginsberg v. Lindel, found that
the fifth amendment barred a construction of the Chandler Act
of 1938 which would void a pre-existing landlord's lien for rent.2
Specifically finding that the Chandler Act would be unconstitutional if applied to pre-existing liens, the Court held:
Congress, in the exercise of the bankruptcy power.... may
not take a property right from one creditor and transfer it without compensation to another without violating the Fifth Amendment. When the vested lien of the landlord is taken away by an
order of the bankruptcy court and the property impressed with
that lien is given to the general creditors of the bankrupt, the
landlord is clearly deprived of a property right without just
compensation. That is as true when the property right is a
landlord's lien as when it is a mortgage.'
In 1960 the Supreme Court again considerd the question
previously addressed in Radford, Wright, and Ginsberg.In Armstrong v. United States," the Court again held that the fifth
amendment protected a vested security interest from retroactive destruction. Specifically, the Court ruled that items
employed in the construction of a naval vessel could not be seized
by the federal government where such seizure would destroy a
materialman's pre-existing security interest in the items.5 In
words which apply equally strongly to Rodrock, Mr. Justice
Black declared:
The total destruction by the Government of all value of these
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible
element of a Fifth Amendment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory measure. Before the
liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none. This
was not because their property vanished into thin air. It was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the
value of the liens, something that the Government could do
because its property was not subject to suit, but which no
private purchaser could have done. Since this acquisition was
for a public use, however accomplished, whether with an intent
107 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1939).
Id at 726. See also, In re Chicago R.I. and R. Ry. Co., 90 F.2d 312, 314 (7th
Cir. 1937).
364 U.S. 40, 44-46 (1960).
Id at 46-48.
3
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or not, the Government's action did destroy them and in the circumstances of this case did thereby take the property value of
those liens within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'
In 1977, the Supreme Court again reaffirmed the prohibition
against impairing such property interests. The Court declared
unconstitutional a statute which impaired a bondholder's interest in revenue originally pledged by the state as security for
the bonds. 7
Thus, in an unbroken succession of cases beginning with
Radford, the federal courts have protected vested security interests such as those possessed by the banks and finance companies in Rodrock. These cases all support the lower courts'
holding in Rodrock that section 522(f)(2) is unconstitutional if applied retroactively. As one court stated:
Radford stands for the proposition that a substantive right in
specific property cannot be substantially impaired by legislation enacted after the right has been created without doing
violence to the property owner's rights to due process. In this
context, it is clear that secured creditor's rights are
substantial.'
After reviewing the post-Radford cases and considering the
United States' argument that Radford did not remain "good"
law, the court further noted that "although Radford may be old,
it is far from dead. Indeed, it stands as a venerable and vigorous
sentinel of due process rights." 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

The issues in Rodrock are not difficult to solve. Retroactive
application of section 522(f)(2) directly conflicts with long-settled
6 Id. at 48-49. There is no doubt that bankruptcy legislation such as section
522(f), which a debtor argues should be construed as retroactively impairing a
lienholder's pre-existing property right, would be a taking for "public use" within
the meaning of the fifth amendment. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 155 n.43 (1974). By seeking to provide relief to debtors, the Congress
serves the "public interest." Personal Fin. Co. of Colorado v. Day, 126 F.2d 281,
282 (10th Cir. 1942). As noted above, however, this does not justify violating the
Constitution.
5 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 629, 632 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
1980).
11Id. at 633. See also, In re Gifford, 50 U.S.L.W. 2454 (7th Cir, Feb. 9, 1982)
(Radford remains valid law).
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principles of statutory construction and constitutional law. A
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation requires that
courts avoid constructions which would even raise serious questions of constitutionality. Another such principle counsels that
amendments to existing laws should be applied prospectively."0
Indeed, bankruptcy amendments have been interpreted uniformly
to avoid retroactive impairment of vested rights. Nothing in the
language of the present Act or section 522(f)(2) itself compels a
different conclusion. Rather, what evidence exists manifests congressional awareness of this policy and an intent to respect it.
If Congress did intend for section 522(f)(2) to apply retroactively, it did so for presumably benign purposes. But as Mr.
Justice Holmes warned more than 50 years ago, courts are "in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."'" This admonition is especially applicable to this case.
The benign purposes of Congress can be achieved prospectively.
Thus, the consistent counsel of past cases, such as Radford,
should be heeded. Substantial impairment of vested property
rights constitutes a "taking" prohibited by the fifth amendment.
Notions of property which cannot be taken without compensation are necessarily slippery and substantially arbitrary. Insofar as a change in law prospectively restricts what an individual will be allowed to have as property, the law may have
its way without substantial objection. But when the rules are
changed abruptly and then applied retroactively to destroy interests for the benefit of others receiving transactional benefits
flowing from the interests to be destroyed, there is a degree of
crassness that, at some point, must make a constitutional difference.2

' "[I]t is presumed that provisions added by the amendment affecting
substantive rights are intended to apply prospectively. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES

AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.36, at 200 (4th ed. (1972)); see also, id. at §
41.02.
"1Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
" For a different view of Radford and retroactive application of § 522(f)(2),
see In re Morris, 12 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
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